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and ordering the test with the highest fDiff.
Thus, Skov and Sherman and Slowiaczek et al. concluded that
many subjects use a suboptimal heuristic strategy that is highly
correlated with the optimal strategy. Remarkably, however,
both the claims (1) that Bayesian diagnosticity (and/or log diag-
nosticity) are theoretically optimal, and (2) that the feature differ-
ence strategy only imperfectly approximates optimal behavior,
are in disrepute.
Both expected Bayesian diagnosticity and expected log dia-
gnosticity are poorly behaved as optimal models. To illustrate,
suppose that Test 1 were positive in 99% of people with Disease
1, and in 100% of the people with Disease 2. Suppose further
that Test 2 were positive in 1% of people with Disease 1, and
99% of people with Disease 2. Test 1 leads, on average, to
50.5% probability of identifying the correct disease; Test 2
leads, on average, to 99% probability of correctly identifying the
true disease. Clearly, Test 2 would be more helpful than Test 1
to differentiate between the diseases. Yet diagnosticity and log
diagnosticity maintain that Test 1 is infinitely more useful
than Test 2! Both diagnosticity measures hold that any test
that offers greater-than-zero probability of obtaining 100% cer-
tainty of the true disease is infinitely useful. This bizarre claim is
not a desirable property of an “optimal” model. (In Nelson
[2005; 2008] I discuss these and other theoretical flaws with the
diagnosticity measures, and how redefining a single point cannot
fix them.)
Better-motivated theoretical models of the value of information,
such as information gain-KL distance (Lindley 1956; Oaksford &
Chater 1994), probability gain (error reduction; cf. Baron’s 1981
talk at the Psychonomic Society Meeting, as cited in Baron
1985), and impact (Klayman & Ha 1987, pp. 219–20; Nelson
2008; Nickerson 1996; Wells & Lindsay 1980) behave reasonably
in this medical diagnosis scenario, and do not suffer from the diag-
nosticity measures’ aforementioned theoretical flaws.
Does the feature difference strategy also approximate these
better-motivated theoretical models? In fact, it exactly corre-
sponds to impact! The highest fDiff feature also has the highest
impact, irrespective of the prior probabilities of the diseases
and the specific feature probabilities (Nelson 2005, footnote 2).
Closer analysis of the supposedly optimal theoretical models
used by some experimenters, and the supposedly suboptimal
heuristics used by some subjects, showed that the subjects’ heur-
istic strategy corresponds to a normative model (impact) that is
theoretically superior to the normative model that the exper-
imenters had in mind! Put in the context of Marr’s (1982)
levels of analysis, consideration of subjects’ behavior at the algo-
rithmic level can inform thinking about the kinds of compu-
tational-level models (normative theories) that are most
appropriate (also see Chater et al. 2003; Cohen 1981).
Do all subjects use the feature difference strategy? No. As O&C
discuss, the means with which information is presented is import-
ant. Different people use a variety of strategies, especially when
environmental probabilities are presented in the standard prob-
ability format, with explicit prior probabilities and likelihoods.
The standard probability format is not the most meaningful to sub-
jects; frequency formats better facilitate Bayesian reasoning (Cos-
mides & Tooby 1996; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage 1995). Personal
experience of environmental probabilities may be evenmore effec-
tive. When environmental probabilities are learned through per-
sonal experience, the vast majority of subjects maximize the
probability of a correct guess (probability gain), rather than
impact or information gain (Nelson et al., submitted). Note that
impact (which the feature difference strategy implements) more
reliably approximates probability gain than do Bayesian
diagnosticity or log diagnosticity (Nelson 2005), and impact is
easily calculated when the standard probability format is used.
Is cognition optimal? Adaptation can be impressive. Insects’
flight length distributions appear well-calibrated to natural
environments (Viswanathan et al. 1999). But the modern world
is evolutionarily novel. For instance, sugar, fat, and salt are avail-
able in unprecedented abundance. Similarly, modern media may
exaggerate the incidence of plane crashes versus car crashes, or
terrorism versus heart disease. The increasing rate of human
genetic evolution (Hawks et al. 2007) may facilitate adaptation
to some modern environments, over phylogenetic time.
Among topics of interest in Bayesian and rational analysis, such
as perception (e.g., Hoffman, in press), memory, information
search, and category formation, the correct function to optimize
is seldom clear. Baron (2004) noted that utilities are formed on
the basis of reflection, and are constantly being modified. As a
pragmatic matter, cognitive science would be wise to treat candi-
date normative models in similar fashion (also see McKenzie
2003). When there are clear and robust discrepancies between
human behavior and a particular theoretical model, the norma-
tive status of the theoretical model should be reconsidered, as
well as the rationality or adaptiveness of the human behavior.
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Abstract: Oaksford & Chater (O&C) subscribe to the view that a
conditional expresses a high conditional probability of the consequent,
given the antecedent, but they model conditionals as expressing a
dependency between antecedent and consequent. Therefore, their
model is inconsistent with their theoretical commitment. The model is
also inconsistent with some findings on how people interpret
conditionals and how they reason from them.
InBayesian Rationality (Oaksford&Chater 2007, henceforthBR)
the authors present a strong theoretical case for the “probabilistic
turn” in the psychology of reasoning. I agree with much of the
general thesis of the book: People often reason from uncertain
information, and they do so by drawing on probabilistic infor-
mation. Conditionals, which form the backbone of much of our
knowledge, express conditional probabilities. I disagreewithOaks-
ford & Chater (O&C), however, in details of their models of how
people reason, and I am less sanguine about the evidence support-
ing these models. I focus on reasoning with conditionals.
O&C’s model of reasoning from conditionals is based on a con-
tingency table of the antecedent (A) and the consequent (C). One
axiom of their model is that the marginal probabilities, P(A) and
P(C), must be constant when the degree of belief in the con-
ditional changes. This is an unfortunate assumption, for two
reasons. First, it is implausible. Assume a new drug X is tested,
and it turns out that it causes headaches. Thus, we increase our
belief in “If a person takes X then they get a headache.”
To accommodate the increase in P(headachejX) in one’s subjec-
tive contingency table, one can either revise P(headachej : X)
Figure 3.
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down to hold P(headache) constant, or else revise P(headache)
up while holding P(headachej:X) constant. The latter appears
more reasonable – as drug X is taken by more people, the
overall rate of headaches will increase, but the probability of
headaches in those who refrain from taking X will not change.
Revising P(headachej:X) down would lead to the absurd con-
clusion that, when many people take X, those who don’t will
benefit because they get fewer headaches.
Second, holding P(C) constant links the conditional to the
probabilistic contrast, that is, the difference between P(CjA)
and P(Cj:A). With P(C) held constant, every increase in belief
in the conditional, that is, every increase in P(CjA), must be
accompanied by a decrease in P(Cj:A), resulting in an increased
probabilistic contrast. As a consequence, there is an ambiguity in
O&C’s model on what a conditional means. Initially, O&C
endorse “the Equation,” that is, the probability of “If A then C”
equals P(CjA), and is independent of P(Cj:A). But later, O&C
seem to endorse the view that a conditional is believable to the
degree that the probabilistic contrast is high. For instance, they
argue that “it is possible to believe a rule strongly that has
many exceptions” (BR, p. 190), as long as the probabilistic con-
trast is high, such as “If a child walks home from school, it is
abducted.” In line with this reasoning, O&C introduce the “inde-
pendence model” as the alternative to a conditional hypothesis.
The independence model means that P(CjA) ¼ P(C), which
implies that the probabilistic contrast is zero. Since the indepen-
dence model is meant to be the alternative to the conditional,
they cannot both have high probability. If the conditional is
defined by the Equation, however, P(CjA) can be high and at
the same time be equal to P(C). For example, the probability
of arriving safely on a flight, given one has a window seat, is
very high, but not different from the unconditional probability
of arriving safely. It follows that the independence model
cannot, in general, be the alternative hypothesis to a conditional
when the latter is defined by the Equation.
My colleagues and I tested whether people interpret condi-
tionals as simply expressing a high P(CjA) or as expressing a
high probabilistic contrast. We found that people’s degree of
belief in a conditional depended only on P(CjA), not on
P(Cj:A), in agreement with the Equation but not with the prob-
abilistic contrast model (Oberauer et al. 2007). This finding
demands a revision of O&C’s argument in defence of the MP-
MT asymmetry (i.e., the finding that people endorse modus
ponens more readily than modus tollens) and their explanation
of theWason selection task, which both assume that the indepen-
dence model is the alternative to the conditional hypothesis.
The evidence for O&C’s model of reasoning with conditionals
is mixed at best. Evidence comes from three sources: (1) The
model fits endorsement rates for the four basic inference
forms. Fitting four data points with three free parameters is no
convincing accomplishment, though. A richer database is pro-
vided by the frequencies of the 16 possible patterns of endorse-
ment or rejection across the four inference forms. I applied seven
formal models of reasoning to such pattern frequencies (Ober-
auer 2006). O&C’s model (Oaksford et al. 2000) provided fits
that were worse than all competitors. (2) The model can
explain established findings such as negation and suppression
effects. Other theories, however, can also explain these effects
(Evans & Handley 1999; Markovits & Barrouillet 2002). There-
fore, these findings do not support O&C’s model over alterna-
tives. (3) Direct manipulation of probabilities is arguably the
most direct and stringent test, because no competing theory pre-
dicts the same effects as the O&C model. There are two series of
experiments using this method. One provided support for the
O&C model (Oaksford et al. 2000), whereas the other did not
(Oberauer et al. 2004). O&C dismiss the latter evidence as diffi-
cult to interpret in light of “the large number of findings showing
probabilistic effects in the conditional-inference task and in the
selection task” (BR, p. 204). At least for the inference task,
I fail to see this large number of confirmatory findings.
One difference between the experiments of Oaksford et al.
(2000) and those of Oberauer et al. (2004) is that we used the
standard deductive instruction, asking participants to judge
whether the conclusion follows with logical necessity from the
premises, whereas Oaksford et al. simply asked whether one
can draw the conclusion. This difference points to a distinction
between goals of reasoning, which I think is not sufficiently
acknowledged by O&C. The goal of deductive reasoning is to
evaluate whether an inference is valid, and in experiments inves-
tigating deduction people are instructed accordingly. Most
experiments cited in support of probabilistic theories of reason-
ing, however, ask people to evaluate the soundness of inferences
or the truth of conclusions. The (sparse) evidence from direct
manipulations of probabilities suggests that people can ignore
probabilities when asked to judge validity, whereas they draw
on probabilities when asked to rate whether the conclusion is
true. Such a modulation of reasoning processes by goals would
be entirely rational.
To conclude, the probabilistic view on human reasoning has
high a priori plausibility, but the version fleshed out by O&C is
conceptually ambiguous and not well supported by the data.
Human reasoning includes a mental logic
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Abstract: Oaksford & Chater (O&C) have rejected logic in favor of
probability theory for reasons that are irrelevant to mental-logic theory,
because mental-logic theory differs from standard logic in significant
ways. Similar to O&C, mental-logic theory rejects the use of the
material conditional and deals with the completeness problem by
limiting the scope of its procedures to local sets of propositions.
In Bayesian Rationality (Oaksford & Chater 2007, henceforth
BR) the authors reject the conception of human reasoning that
focuses on logical inferences, arguing that probability theory
should be used instead to account for rationality. Given space
limitations, I here address only the two most prominent
reasons Oaksford & Chater (O&C) present to reject logic,
arguing that they fail to appreciate what mental-logic theory
actually proposes.
First, mental-logic theory (e.g., Braine 1990; Braine & O’Brien
1991; 1998; O’Brien 1993; 2004; O’Brien & Manfrinati, in press)
consistently has proposed that mental logic differs from standard
logic. O&C equate the logical view of conditionals with the truth
table for the material conditional (if p then q is true unless p is
true and q is false). Indeed, Oaksford and Chater (2003a)
stated that the Braine and O’Brien theory includes the material
conditional for if p then q. The problem with their criticism is
that Braine and O’Brien consistently argued that the material
conditional does not capture psychological reality. Our theory
of conditionals consists instead of two schemas: one for modus
ponens (MP) and another for conditional proof. The conditional
proof schema states that to derive or evaluate if p then q, first
suppose p; when q follows from the supposition of p together
with other information assumed, one may assert if p then q.
The schema is applied with a reasoning program that supposes
p and then treats q as a tentative conclusion to be evaluated.
When one evaluates a conditional if not p then not q from the
premise p or q, one concludes that the conditional is false,
even though this evaluation would not follow when treating if
as the material conditional (because p might be false). Thus,
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